Written by Muhammad Erza Pradana
America’s unipolar moment has ended. But if the world is no longer unipolar, what is it then? Many have argued that we are in a multipolar world. Their reasoning seems to be rather straightforward: in addition to the declining power and influence of the United States, we are seeing the rise of new centers of power. States like China, Russia, India, and Brazil are often viewed as the new poles in the international system.
I take issue with the claim that the world has become multipolar. I argue that the world is not multipolar—and it is unlikely to become one either. And just like the ever more popular multipolar argument, my reasoning for why the world isn’t multipolar is also straightforward: Other than the United States and China—the world’s two most powerful states—no states in the system—yes, not even Russia—are qualified to be considered a pole and thus a peer to both Washington and Beijing.
Getting Polarity Right
The main problem with the multipolar argument is that its advocate employed a rather broad definition of poles. Therefore, for us to categorize a system based on the distribution of power among its units, it is imperative that we get the concept of polarity right. Polarity, in the Waltzian and widely accepted—although by no means universal—version refers to the distribution of power among states. Or, in other words, polarity points to the number of great powers in the system (Waltz, 1964; 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001; Grieco, 2007). Similarly, William Wohlforth (2022) argued that “polarity is simply the number of especially capable powers in the international system.”
What does it take for one to be considered a pole? Since polarity is inextricably linked with the concept of power, to answer that question, we also need to clarify the definition of power first. There are two main ways IR scholars define power: power as resources (material) and power as influence (Beckley, 2018). The first definition of power, however, is the most widely accepted. Thus, power refers to the material capabilities of states, which traditionally include economic, military, and technological might (Waltz, 1979; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016; Brooks, 2019).
IR scholars have identified three basic forms of polarity, which are determined by “changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” (Waltz, 1979). The first is unipolarity, which is to say that the system has only one capable state that is so far ahead of the rest. Second, bipolarity is defined as a system that contains two especially powerful states in the same league as each other. Third and lastly is multipolarity, where the system has three or more roughly equal capable states.
This implies that for an international system to be characterized as multipolar, there must be 3 or more roughly equal capable states. In other words, these states must be in the same league with each other. In Wohlforth’s (2022) words, “[a] multipolar system is one in which there are three or more roughly evenly matched poles at the top of the state system.” (see also: Brooks & Wohlforth, 2023). While one state may command an advantage in one element of power, overall they are not enough to put one state way above the others.
Has the World Become Multipolar?
In a word: no.. The world has not become multipolar, nor is it becoming either. The proponents of the multipolar argument seem to have greatly exaggerated the rise of the so-called new centers of power outside the United States and China. As one columnist argued, “the mere fact that there are rising middle powers and nonaligned countries with large populations and growing economies does not make the world multipolar” (Bekkevold, 2023).
It is certainly the case that the power gap that the United States had vis-à-vis other states has been narrowing since the end of the Cold War. However, China has been the main protagonist when it comes to narrowing the power gap. Over the past decades, Beijing has been a remarkable rise to the great power rank, and while it is yet to completely level the playing field vis-à-vis Washington, China has nonetheless emerged as a capable peer to the United States, increasingly asserting its power and influence in Asia and challenging America’s presence in the region. “China,” Øystein Tunsjø (2018) argued, “has increased its combined score across all dimensions of power sufficiently to have reached top ranking, even though China has not obtained power parity with the United States.” Randall Schweller (2022) also makes a similar claim when he explains the similarities between the Cold War world and today’s world: “The most obvious similarity is the existence of a bipolar rivalry between two superpowers, the United States and China.”
My claim might raise a question: “Why? Aren’t other states such as Russia, India, and Brazil also rising?” Sure, yes. These states have indeed been rising over the past years or so, and yet they haven’t risen far enough. In other words, they haven’t risen up to the level where they would be considered roughly equal to that of the United States and China. To demonstrate this, let us take a look at the following statistics.
From an economic standpoint, the United States, despite the impressive economic growth of states like China and India, still ranks first in terms of total GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund (2024), the US stands at $28.78 trillion, while China ranks second with $18.52 trillion. Meanwhile, Russia’s $2.06 trillion economy ranks far below both the US and China and even below India’s $3.94 trillion and Brazil’s 2.33 trillion economies.
Furthermore, GDP per Capita also shows the lead that the United States and China have. The IMF indicates that the United States numbers stand at $85370 in terms, while other powers stand way below the US, with China’s numbers standing at $13140. The widely dubbed emerging powers, on the other hand, are no way near Washington and Beijing, which
indicates that both superpowers are by far more economically developed than these other states. In short, from an economic standpoint, the United States and China are way ahead of the rest of the world, and judging from the trends, this is unlikely to change anytime soon.
In terms of military might, the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index ranks the United States 1st in terms of conventional military power in 2023. The Institute’s overall score for US military capability is 90.7, while China ranked 2nd with a score of 68.1. Other major powers, meanwhile, are nowhere near the United States. Russia, for instance, ranks third with a 52.5 overall military capability score, while India, with its score of 44.1, ranks down in fourth. Furthermore, the Index also indicates that in terms of Weapons and Platforms (which measures the overall “land, maritime, and air warfare assets and capabilities”), the United States overall score sits at 97.4, which is way ahead of China’s 63.9 and Russia’s 47.1. Again, these statistics highlight just how far ahead the United States and China are compared to the rest of the world.
In conclusion, I argue the world is not multipolar and is not about to become one either. This is not to deny the fact that the gap between the United States and the rest of the world has been narrowing, because it certainly has. Yet, in my view, China gets the main credit for this narrowing power gap. Beijing has risen up to a roughly equal position to the United States, thus making it a peer. Some people might cite Russia as the third pole in the system, but as the statistics show, this is not the case. As Dale Copeland (2023) wrote, “Russia’s continued ability to play the role of spoiler, however, should not distract us from a larger geopolitical fact: it is the bipolar struggle between the United States and China that is the new Great Game of the twenty-first century.” Other states in the system, furthermore, are still way off toward equaling both Washington and Beijing. All of these make the system bipolar rather than multipolar.
References
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Bekkevold, J. I. (2023, September 22). Stop Saying the World Is Multipolar. Foreign Policy. Retrieved July 6, 2024, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/22/multipolar-world-bipolar-power-geopolitics-bus iness-strategy-china-united-states-india/
Brooks, S. G. (2019). Power transitions, then and now: Five new structural barriers that will constrain China’s rise. China International Strategy Review, 1, 65–83.
Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2016). The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States. Foreign Affairs, 95(91).
Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2023). The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power. Foreign Affairs, 102(76).
Copeland, D. C. (2024). A World Safe for Commerce: American Foreign Policy from the Revolution to the Rise of China. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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